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Abstract This article critically analyzes the assumption
that land is becoming increasingly scarce and that, there-
fore, farmland values are bound to rise across the globe. It
investigates the process of land value creation, as well as
its flipside: value erosion and stagnation, looking at the
various mechanisms involved in each. As such, it is a study
of how the financialization of agriculture affects the pro-
cess of land commoditization. I show that, for farmland to
be turned into an asset, a whole range of conditions have to
be fulfilled, presenting a typology of asset making in the
context of farmland. Asset making, like commoditization,
is a process of assemblage, and it is less straightforward
and less stable than generally assumed. Further, I argue that
‘asset making’ is not a one-way process. The article is
based on an analysis of global data on land values and the
case of farmland investment in post-Soviet farmland
(Russia and Ukraine).
Keywords Farmland  Investment  Value 
Financialization  Commoditization  Natural resources 
Finance  Asset  Land grab  Russia  Ukraine
Introduction
Since the food price hikes of 2007/2008 and the global
financial crisis, farmland and the agricultural sector have
attracted rapidly growing attention from a financial sector
looking for new and supposedly less risky ways to make
money. The financial industry’s new appetite for farmland
has fueled the so-called global land rush or land grab.
While academic research focused initially at states
acquiring farmland abroad, and the most visible private
actors, attention for the role of finance in farmland (and
food) has grown recently (McMichael 2012; Daniel 2012;
Fairbairn 2014; Isakson 2014).
Neo-classical and neo-institutional studies have focused
on how to enhance the positive impacts of farmland
investment (Deininger et al. 2011). Political-economy
research has highlighted its risks, studying the growing role
of finance in the context of the transformation of the global
‘food regime’ (McMichael 2012). In these studies, finan-
cialization has been interpreted as a deepening of the
corporate control over agriculture. In addition to a broad
range of macro studies (Clapp 2014; McMichael 2012),
some articles have emerged that study particular groups of
financial actors in the food system, such as agrofood
commodity traders (Salerno this issue), private equity firms
(Daniel 2012) and farmland fund managers (Ducastel and
Anseeuw this issue).
In-depth studies on financial actors in farmland based on
empirical field research are still rare (an exception is
Fairbairn 2014). This gap seems to reinforce the tendency
that finance’s role in agriculture is ‘‘conceived largely on a
macro level’’ (Williams 2014, p. 402), with finance as ‘‘the
main character [which] is present, and yet largely absent’’
(Ouma 2015, p. 163). This seems to be true for political
economy studies as well as for neo-classical and neo-in-
stitutional approaches. Subsequently, there is a danger of
assuming the expansion and deepening of the ‘universal’
dynamics of ‘capital’—such as ‘accumulation by dispos-
session’ (Hall 2013)—or the ‘market’—growing effi-
ciency—in the agricultural sector, with research on
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farmland investment becoming a search for indicators
confirming these respective dynamics. Discourses that fit
within these assumed dynamics will, subsequently not
receive the critical examination they need.
In this article I critically evaluate the dominant narrative
for speculating in land. Specifically, I deconstruct the
assumption that farmland is becoming an increasingly
scarce asset, the value of which is only bound to increase as
more investors flock to the sector in search of profits from
both increased agricultural production and the appreciation
of farmland prices. Interestingly, this narrative is evident
across a wide range of ideological perspectives, from neo-
classical to neo-Marxist scholars, and among investors as
well as activists, although the highlighted causes diverge.1
The fact that so many actors invest in land might easily be
interpreted as proof that farmland prices rise globally and
farmland investment is indeed a profitable business, and the
grip of finance on agriculture will become firmer across the
globe. Why else would so many actors engage in it?
This article takes a critical look at the above-mentioned
idea underlying the land rush. It will investigate the process
of land value creation (as well as its flipside value erosion
and stagnation), looking at the various mechanisms
involved. It examines how investors (attempt to) turn
farmland into a financial asset, as an important aspect of
financialization in agriculture. This means that, like any
other asset in an investment portfolio, it can be abstracted,
assessed according to benchmarks, and sometimes even
sliced and diced—as a result, becoming increasingly ‘dis-
tanced’ from the fixed, localized, and lumpy commodity
that land is typically seen as. Financialization is defined
here as the process in which various parts of the economy
are becoming increasingly influenced by the logic (dis-
courses as well as practices) of the financial sector.
The article makes the case that asset making, interpreted
as an advanced, yet distinct, form of commoditization, is
not a smooth, clear-cut or universal process that is bound to
happen when demand rises and financial investors enter
farmland. I show that, for farmland to be turned into an
asset, a whole range of conditions has to be fulfilled. Asset
making, like commoditization, is a process of assemblage
(cf. Li 2014), and it will be shown to be less straightfor-
ward and less fixed than generally assumed. The article
draws on the groundbreaking article of Li (2014), where
she argues that rendering land investible requires active
efforts of assemblage. While Li mainly focuses on the
intricate process of land becoming an asset, the present
article also deals extensively with the flipside of that.2
Specifically, I refer to the ‘de-assetisation’, the unmaking
or ‘erosion’, of farmland as an asset. For analyzing the
latter aspect of unmaking an asset, I draw on very recent—
and still sparse—work stressing the ‘unfixity’ of invest-
ment in agriculture (Ouma 2015; Williams 2014).
While these publications have stressed such ‘unfixity’,
they do not investigate farmland investment empirically
through fieldwork.3 As Ouma (2015, p. 163) states, ‘‘we are
yet to develop a more grounded understanding of how
farmland/agriculture is being turned into ‘an alternative
asset class’’’. This article aims to develop a typology of
asset making in farmland, building on insights from valu-
ation studies, studies on ‘resource making’, and ‘social
science studies of finance’. This typology will then be
applied empirically in two ways. First, I will analyze global
discourses and representations, based on investor reports
and graphs (about land values). Second, like Ducastel and
Anseeuw (forthcoming)—based on South Africa -, this
article presents an empirical, fieldwork-based case of asset
making in farmland. I will provide an in-depth analysis of
investor discourses and asset making in the post-Soviet
region, particularly Russia and Ukraine—which has been
heralded as the re-emerging ‘global breadbasket’ (Visser
et al. 2014)—based on multi-sited fieldwork.
This case is particularly relevant, as rapid financializa-
tion has taken place in the farmland sector in the post-
Soviet region. By 2009, Russia and Ukraine already
accounted for most farmland companies listed on the stock
exchange in the world (Visser et al. 2012).4 Further, this
case clearly shows the limits and contradictions of asset
making, featuring a drop in farmland values after an early
farmland rush period with high expectations of land
appreciation and aggressive land acquisitions.
This article has the following structure. The first section
lays out the theoretical framework. The next section called
‘a typology of asset making in farmland’, presents five
requirements for asset making: scarcity, potential for profit,
liquidity, standardization and legitimacy. The third section,
presents a critical assessment of the widespread assumption
of increasing global land scarcity and a pervasive rise of
land values. The next sections demonstrate various criteria
of the asset making typology (in particular scarcity and
legitimacy) by applying them to fieldwork data from the
post-Soviet region. The remainder of the article looks at
1 Neo-classical economists stress ‘market fundamentals’ such as
population growth and farmland reduction, while critical agrarian and
food studies highlight causes such as financial deregulation, specu-
lation, and policies privileging large-scale investors.
2 Li briefly discusses the latter.
3 Williams’ empirical case (the Canadian wheat board) focuses on
food commodities not farmland.
4 In the past 2–3 years the number of listed companies in this region
has gone down (Kuns et al. 2014) as a result of the stagnating
farmland boom discussed further on.
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criteria from the typology that were not met in the real life
asset making to explain the subsequent erosion of the
‘assetness’ of post-Soviet farmland. Thus, a section anal-
yses how ‘insufficient scarcity’ of farmland has caused
stagnant farmland values and discusses the mismatch
between discourses of closing yield gaps, and the failure to
do so. Another section analyses how the overoptimistic
expectations about closing yield gaps came into existence,
showing how a ‘fetishization’ of soil led to an ignorance of
other relevant factors. As such, it demonstrates the limits of
standardization (another requirement of the typology). The
final section concludes.
Financialization, natural resources, and asset
making
This article focuses on the recent process of asset making
that is part of the current land rush. However, it should be
noted that the commoditization of farmland predates the
recent financialization of farmland. Land has been sold,
hired, valued, and taxed for many centuries in various parts
of the world (particularly in the West). In other cases where
farmland acquired by financial investors was previously
common property, the financialization of the agricultural
sector results in enclosure and previously non-commodi-
tized land being turned into a commodity (White et al.
2012). In many other cases, a certain extent of commodi-
tization (e.g. localized sale of land) predates the current
finance-driven land rush. In such instances, the entrance of
financial actors does not represent a binary shift (from non-
commoditized to commoditized), but rather a change along
a continuum to a higher degree of commoditization.
The financialization of agriculture entails, among others
things, that land is made into a financial asset, which can be
valued, easily inserted and taken out of investment port-
folios, and subsequently speculated on by financial inves-
tors. In the process, it becomes increasingly abstracted and
distanced from the physical land. Asset making can thus
been seen as an ‘advanced’ stage of commoditization—or,
in the case of a natural resource like land, we might more
precisely speak of ‘resource making’ (as a specific category
of commoditization). As such, it potentially offers inves-
tors additional benefits (such as increased liquidity) over an
object that is only commoditized. However, at the same
time, it also requires additional work of assembling, as will
be explained below.5
Valuation studies
Asset making can be fruitfully analyzed as a process of
valuation: assessing, communicating, and—to some
extent—producing value. A blossoming field of valuation
studies has recently emerged (C¸alis¸kan and Callon 2009;
Lamont 2012; Styhre 2013; Vatin 2013), which builds on
earlier work in sociology and anthropology (Appadurai
1988). The field is characterized by a focus on valuation as
a practice or process, rather than on value as just a feature
of an object. An insight emerging from this literature is that
the process of valuation requires assemblage work, as it is
not a natural process (C¸alis¸kan and Callon 2009; and cf. Li
2014). What we call a ‘natural resource’ is ‘‘a provisional
assemblage of heterogeneous elements including material
substances, technologies, discourses and practices’’ (Li
2014, p. 589). Of relevance here is also the conceptual-
ization of valuation as consisting of two main processes:
categorization (often involving standardization), and le-
gitimation (Lamont 2012).
Building further on the idea of assemblage, valuation
studies argue that valuation does not result from abstract
market forces, but from the work of concrete actors, among
whom some have a much more powerful role than others in
the creation of value (C¸alis¸kan and Callon 2009, p. 387,
389). The present article primarily focuses on this creation
process, and in so doing, it also gives ample attention to
two major actors within the process: the direct farmland
investors (the large farm companies, or ‘agroholdings’
owned by actors outside the agriculture sector) and large
farmland brokers/consultants.6
Resource making
While valuation studies provide useful insights in the social
construction of value, they give limited attention for how
the materiality of an object engenders and limits the con-
struction and subsequent boosting of value. With regard to
natural resources like farmland, however, materiality plays
a very important role. Although it is important to concep-
tualize resource making as a human process—in line with
Zimmermann’s (1951, p. 15) dictum that ‘‘resources are
not; they become’’—one should not overlook the limits set
by the supposedly ‘inanimate’ world to human cognitive
and practical remaking (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014,
p. 15). Indeed, as Richardson and Weszkalnys (2014, p. 15)
argue, ‘‘the ‘becoming’ of resources is now better under-
stood in terms of the uses and possibilities that matter
5 This process of asset making and broader financialization is likely
to decrease the power of rural actors, with all the multifaceted,
contradictory, and potentially very impactful consequences for their
livelihoods (cf. Bridge 2009).
6 For an analysis focused on fund managers, see Ducastel and
Anseeuw (this issue). Kuns et al. (2014) analyze interaction between
direct farmland investors (agroholdings) and indirect investors (e.g.
pension funds).
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affords to us –what may be referred to as material agency
or potentiality, which themselves depend on the historical,
social and material environments which inform the con-
stitution of the resource matter.’’ (cf. Bennett 2010).
Another insight from the field of resource making is that
natural resources are ‘‘a potent social category into
which—and out of which—can slip those parts of the non-
human world to which humans attached value’’ (Bridge
2009, p. 1218). A financial asset, like a resource, is an
assemblage which does not automatically have fixity of
itself. It can be reassembled and reconstituted, with various
components combined into new arrangements (Li 2014).
Valuation studies also investigate how objects become
commoditized or de-commoditized (Appadurai 1988), but
focus on socio-cultural causes. Work on resource making
pays more attention to how material changes of the object
itself (whether resulting from humans actions or natural
causes) and wider economic and technological change
affect the value of resources. The process of resource
making is not just a move between a dichotomy of non-
resource and resource (or vice versa). Instead, the making
of a resource and its more ‘advanced’ form of commodi-
tization/‘resourceness’ (becoming a financial asset) are
often complex and multi-faceted processes (cf. Ducastel
and Anseeuw this issue).
Fundamentally, resource making is a process of
abstraction (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, p. 13),
which includes separation and simplification/reduction,
both on the material and the conceptual levels. Physical
abstraction may be paralleled by the resource’s homoge-
nization and standardization (e.g. Richardson and Wesz-
kalnys 2014, p. 13). The term ‘(farm)land’ itself is already
an abstraction (Li 2014).
An important feature that distinguishes farmland from
most other resources (Li 2014) is that it features both a use
function (cultivation) and a function as a store of value or
source of appreciation. Normally, resources have either a—
often one time—productive/use function (e.g. oil) or a
function as a store of value (e.g. gold). Farmland, however,
can potentially offer both, functioning as a kind of ‘gold
with yield’, as some investors have called agricultural land
(Fairbairn 2014).7
Sociology of finance
Once a natural object has been constructed as a resource,
additional assembling is necessary to transform it into a
financial asset. For studying this last step, the sociology of
finance—and more broadly, the social science study of
finance—offers valuable insights, particularly with regard
to valuation in (and by) the financial industry and the
construction of liquidity (Carruthers and Stinchcombe
1999). A key requirement in order for a resource (or
another object) to become a financial asset is its liquidity.
Liquidity can be defined as ‘‘the degree to which an asset is
a fungible, generalized resource’’ (ibid, p. 375). Mecha-
nisms that make a good more easily transferrable (i.e.
reduce transaction costs), such as secure property rights,
those which make a good knowable (categorization), and
which increase demand, make an object liquid (ibid,
p. 377). Standardization is key to enhancing liquidity, as it
makes a good more easily knowable, subsequently more
transferrable, and thus tends to increase demand (ibid).
A typology of asset making in farmland
Agricultural land as a resource has long been excluded
from financialization. The local, natural specifics of land
and farming impede the abstraction and especially stan-
dardization that involve turning a commodity or natural
resource into an asset. The production of an asset will be
analyzed here as a financialization process, in which an
asset is defined as any value recognized as such by finan-
cial markets. To get such a ‘stamp’ of recognition, a good
(or service) must be framed to fit with the financial market
requirements. These requirements are: (1) the potential for
profit that an object can generate in the future, preferably
outperforming the average profits on financial markets; (2)
the scarcity of an object; (3) the liquidity of an object,
which should be sufficiently ‘liquid’ to be easily sold when
the investors see fit, with a profit based on the asset’s
appreciation (cf. Ducastel and Anseeuw, this issue); (4) the
standardization of an object, which should be comparable
to other assets through standardized indicators and bench-
marks, in order to determine its value; (5) the legitimacy of
an object, which should be framed as ‘normal’ and socially
acceptable, and at least not considered ‘immoral’, in order
for it to be treated as an asset (within the financial sector).
The wider context for these requirements is that state
regulation is needed to facilitate them. Each of these five
points will now be discussed.
Potential for profit
A key aspect of asset making is constructing a pre-
dictable profitability, in other words ‘‘clear and defined
income streams’’ (Leyshon and Thrift 2007, p. 100; cf.
Ducastel and Anseeuw this issue). In investment projects,
historical patterns of profits and appreciation for similar
investment objects are typically used to assess the potential
for profit (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999; Williams
2014, p. 415). As farmland investment is a very new asset
7 However, combining the two is not always easy (Kuns et al. 2014;
Visser 2015).
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class—particularly in emerging economies—this type of
historical data is not (readily) available. As a consequence,
the profit potential has to be gauged more tentatively, by
taking some characteristics of the asset in the making
(farmland) and comparing it with the productivity, land
prices, and profits of similar kinds of farmland in devel-
oped countries where such data is (more) available.
In the process of asset making and value creation, a few
key material aspects of the farmland resource play a role in
determining its potential profitability. I discuss these
aspects below, based on my interpretation and categoriza-
tion of various investor criteria used in publications such as
Savills (2012, p. 14), one of the world’s largest multina-
tional real estate companies.
Firstly, there are some baseline material characteristics
of the resource land. Although all aspects of the evaluation
of land value are, to some extent, subjective—depending
on the type of evaluator/brokers and the benchmarks they
use—these baseline material features are most objective.
The inherent soil quality is generally seen as the logical
first determinant of farmland value. Other aspects of land
are how square and flat it is. Location in relation to relevant
infrastructure and water availability are other important
factors. In evaluating land value, some standardization is
necessary (e.g. using a broad soil category or average
precipitation) to enable comparisons with farmland
elsewhere.
Secondly, the potential for yield increases is assessed.
Investors are less interested in high productivity per se as
they are in the potential to increase it. This is because land
with low productivity (which is therefore low value, or
‘undervalued’) can be turned into productive, high value
land. The idea is that great value can be ‘unlocked’ with
new technology that outside investors with deep pockets
can bring in. This is why agricultural land in the Global
South and emerging markets has drawn so much attention.
It is these regions—where land is cheap and farms have
been (supposedly) inefficient—that feature potentially huge
increases in productivity, and thus value.
Comparison becomes even more important for deter-
mining yield increases than for baseline characteristics.
The key indicator currently in use is the yield gap; it has
been made into a main, standardized device for assessing
investor potential by the financial industry literature,
investor conferences, and reports from international agen-
cies like the World Bank (Deininger et al. 2011), as criti-
cally discussed by Li (2014) and McMichael (2012). The
difference between the actual and the potential yields is
based on a comparison of production localities with simi-
lar, standardized baseline material characteristics, such as
soil (see also point 4 on standardization below).
Thirdly, a certain scale (or scalability) of the natural
resource is deemed necessary for making it an asset. This is
because some innovations to increase productivity (and
close the yield gap)—such as large machinery—would not
be cost effective on small plots, whereas larger plots would
enable economies of scale.8 Further, buying a resource
such as land involves transactions costs, such as costs for
evaluating the value and registering land titles. For small
plots of land, this would not be a profitable exercise.
Scarcity
Another aspect relevant to asset making is scarcity. An
object can become a commodity without being scarce. For
instance, when the prairies were opened up during the
westward expansion of the United States, land was abun-
dant; at the same time, it was a commodity, as it was priced
and sold. However, scarcity is certainly a factor conducive
to asset making. This pertains mainly to assets where
appreciation is a major attraction for investors. Farmland,
like real estate, is generally included in an investment
portfolio because of its potential for appreciation. For a
financial asset to appreciate, it should be scarce, or at least
widely perceived to be so, in order to have (excessive)
demand driving up the price. Although, obviously the
Earth’s land is finite, ‘‘scarcity rarely takes place due to the
natural order of things’’. (Mehta 2010, p.3). With imperfect
information, decision making by an investor (and other
actors) is based on his/her perception of scarcity. Thus, the
dominant discourse about scarcity, at that moment, is likely
to influence the investor’s choice. Discursive scarcity
might be rather decoupled from reality. The supply of a
resource (farmland), aside from the (bio)physical amount,
is also determined by institutional conditions (such as
regulations on land sales). As these depend on policy
choices, scarcity is far from a neutral, depoliticized term.9
Scarcity, in sum, is a ‘‘time-bound and contextual phe-
nomenon’’ (Mehta 2010, p. 3).
Standardization
The wider literature on financialization has shown that
standardization is an essential property of (liquid) invest-
ment (e.g. Williams 2014, p. 415; C¸alis¸kan and Callon
2009) and thus a key element in asset making. As men-
tioned earlier, agriculture has been excluded from finan-
cialization until recently, as the local and natural specifics
of land plots make abstraction and standardization difficult.
In the past years, however, investment brokerage and
8 There are also dis-economies of scale, related to e.g. monitoring
costs. Some innovations (e.g. knowledge and biodiversity based)
might be more effective on small farms.
9 Part of scarcity results from exclusion and unequal access (Mehta
2010).
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consultancy firms (Knight Frank and Citi Private Bank
2011; Savills 2012), and international development agen-
cies and banks—notably, the World Bank (Deininger et al.
2011)—have put together reports, maps, and graphs to
facilitate a standardized assessment and subsequent com-
parison of agricultural areas across the world in terms of,
for instance, soil fertility, yield gaps, and land values (cf. Li
2014). These products are tools that provide investors with
benchmarks to guide them in the process of selecting
investment localities, in what was previously a rather non-
transparent and highly localized sector (which is, arguably,
still true to a large extent, as will be discussed later on). In
this paper’s fourth section, one such comparison tool will
be critically assessed.
Liquidity
Liquidity, or ‘‘the degree to which an asset is a fungible,
generalized resource’’ (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999,
p. 375), depends on the ease with which an asset can be
bought and sold. Mechanisms that make assets more easily
transferrable (thus reducing transactions costs) and know-
able (indirectly leading to lower transaction costs) enhance
liquidity, as does anything increasing demand (ibid,
p. 377).
First, in the case of farmland’s features, scale is espe-
cially important. As mentioned above, there is more
demand for larger plots, as they can be worked more effi-
ciently with big machinery, making them easier to sell.
Lower relative transactions costs also increase liquidity.
Furthermore, large landholdings allow a farm company to
be listed on a stock exchange, adding further liquidity.
Second, the broader economic and institutional envi-
ronment is even more important for liquidity than the
features of the land plot itself. Particularly important are
the security of property rights and the extent to which the
law facilitates its easy sale. International development
agencies, such as the World Bank, are lobbying for free
land markets. Even with more liberal land markets, farm-
land remains rather illiquid, if it can only be sold as a
physical land plot.
There is a clear link between standardization and liq-
uidity. As Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999, p. 375)
argue, ‘‘[v]alue that is difficult to discern, or hard to
communicate credibly to a large number of potential
buyers, (…) makes an asset illiquid’’. Standardization
alleviates tends to increase liquidity (ibid).
Third, there are several aspects of contemporary finan-
cialization that have the potential to increase the liquidity
of farmland. One example is the aggregation of farmland
into large landholdings, enabling farm enterprises to issues
shares, and even be listed on the stock exchange. This has
been taking place in South-America with agribusiness
giants such as AdecoAgro, Cosan, and Cresud, which
control hundreds of thousands hectares of land and are
traded on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ
(Fairbairn 2014, p. 15; and personal communication). This
has also occurred in post-Soviet agriculture, at an initially
even greater pace (Visser and Spoor 2011; Visser et al.
2012). Another mechanism is splitting up farm enterprises
into a publicly listed farmland real estate investment trust
(REIT) that owns and rents outs the land, and a (non-listed)
enterprise operating the farmland (Fairbairn 2014). In those
cases a process of abstraction occurs, with ownership
increasingly distant and dispersed (cf. Clapp 2014).
Legitimacy
As previously mentioned, this requirement refers to the
extent to which an asset can be framed as ‘normal’, as
legitimate (or at least not considered ‘immoral’) when
treated as such, which is an important element in creating/
establishing value (Lamont 2012). Clearly, this is not an
objective criterion. Relevant here is whether investors
succeed to frame an investment as more or less legitimate,
and to preclude that an opposite framing (as immoral)
becomes dominant.
With ‘peculiar goods’ such as objects of nature, the
process of turning it into a commodity—let alone making it
into a financial asset—can be very controversial (Styhre
2013). An important feature that distinguishes land from
most other resources is its strong social (life giving)
function (Li 2014). Acquiring farmland in food insecure
African countries for export crops or biofuel, is increas-
ingly seen as socially unacceptable in investment circles,
due to NGOs’ active advocacy.10 Further on, I will show
how (and why) farmland investment in the post-Soviet
region is considered much more acceptable than, for
instance, in Africa.
I will now apply the typology empirically, starting with
the criteria of scarcity.
Scarcity and rising farmland values: analyzing
global investor discourse
Global investment reports and conferences construct the
idea that land is becoming increasingly scarce and that
consequently land values everywhere are bound to rise in
value. The Savills report (2012, p. 14), for instance, pre-
sents a graph showing the rising number of people in the
world per hectare, which is further reinforced by declining
stocks of land due to urbanization and climate change.
Other factors that are often stressed are dietary changes
10 This is not to say that such acquisitions no longer occur.
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towards more livestock products in emerging economies,
propping up demand for food and land. The rapid economic
growth of the emerging economies is used to underline the
high pace with which land is becoming scarce. Food price
hikes are brought in as further proof of the food shortage
and the subsequent pressing need for land. These factors
are, in the investor parlance, the ‘market fundamentals’.
Furthermore, Mark Twain’s statement: ‘‘buy land, they’re
not making it anymore,’’ is frequently quoted in investment
prospectuses to lend some literary support to the dry fig-
ures, and indicate what should be the simple, logical
reaction.
Various critical studies (e.g. McMichael 2012) have
shown that changes in such ‘market fundamentals’ as
population growth and diet trends are in fact rather gradual,
and therefore cannot explain the short-term food price
hikes or rising land values (if the latter is indeed true).11
However, this evidence is largely absent in the investors’
discourse.
Once the notion of land scarcity is firmly established
discursively, it lends support to predictions of a rapid rise
in global land values and the subsequent profitability of
farmland investment. A Savills report (2012, p. 14) even
states that: ‘‘Our Global Farmland Index (in US$ per
hectare) shows that farmland values across the globe have
increased up to 1800 % during the past decade, with the
highest growth recorded in the emerging markets’’. With
no firm data on land values in most countries beyond the
West, there is a lot of room for selective interpretation. For
instance, the striking figure of 1800 % was only recorded
in Romania (ibid), with prices hikes much lower in all
other countries. It is unclear how such reports come to a
global average of land price growth.
It is, thus, relevant to more closely examine some visual
representations of the ‘land rush’ by investment brokers.
For instance, the Knight Frank farmland index (see
Table 1) suggests impressive annual growth in global land
values, based on 2010 price changes. However, a closer
look shows that the table presents a highly selective group
of cases.
First, the selected group of countries features several
developed countries, only one from the African continent
(Zambia), and no Asian countries. Second, most of the
countries’ figures do not indicate averages for their farm-
lands, but only certain, mostly well-endowed, agricultural
regions. For instance, the figures for Brazil include ‘‘Dry-
land double cropping in Mato Grosso’’ or ‘‘West Bahia’’.
For Argentina, only the Northern and central provinces are
included. For Canada, only Saskatchewan is included. This
is a rather exceptional Canadian region, where investors
from outside the province had not been allowed to buy land
until recently, which drastically contained the rise of land
prices (Sommerville and Magnan 2015). With the abol-
ishment of this regulation, prices have jumped to the level
of neighboring provinces. In other cases, land prices are
only presented for land with rather good characteristics
(e.g. ‘‘quality dryland in corn belt states’’ for the United
States, or ‘‘dryland arable with reliable rainfall’’ for Aus-
tralia). Third, there are serious questions about the relia-
bility of the underlying data, especially for countries in the
Global South. Fourth, and finally, in some of the listed
countries with high land price hikes, this rise has already
flattened or stagnated since the data was collected (in
2009/2010). In Argentina, for instance, due to economic
crisis and increased export taxes on agricultural com-
modities, many outside investors have withdrawn from
agriculture. Land prices are still growing only in the prime
agricultural areas of central Argentina, and at a much lower
pace.12 In neighboring Brazil, agricultural production
continues to boom—in the soy producing regions—and
land prices continue to rise. However, with the recent crisis
in the sugar sector, land prices in the sugar producing
regions are stagnating, albeit not falling.13
My intention here is not to argue that the rise of land
prices does not occur at all. Rather, I argue that it is not a
universal, global, and unilinear trend. The rise of land
value is, for instance, clearly happening in parts of Brazil,
the United States, and Romania. However, such cases
feature a rare conjunction of factors favorable for rises in
land prices, which are absent in most other contexts. In
Romania, for instance, the initial low land prices combine
with a relatively good river infrastructure, ports with easy
access to the world market, and a number of EU-related
features, such as proximity, and free access, to the EU
market, agricultural subsidies, and good legal protection of
land rights. Furthermore, Romania’s 2007 accession to the
EU coincides neatly with the global land rush. All these
factors created an ideal context—or a ‘perfect storm’—for
a land price hike. Therefore, the case of Russia would
likely be closer to the typical developments of many
developing and emerging countries, and therefore more
instructive.
To sum up, tables used to depict the farmland rush, such
as the one analyzed above, are far from a general reflection
of global land price developments. Instead, they are highly
11 Instead, the main influencing factors are the expectation of rising
food and land shortages, combined with the conversion of farmland
from food towards biofuel production, and increased speculation with
food commodities.
12 Personal communication with Sebastia´n Senesi (School of Agron-
omy-UBA, Argentina) 8 August Milan, Italy.
13 Personal communication with Bastiaan Reydon (UNICAMP,
Brazil) 9 July 2015 Utrecht, Netherlands.
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selective representations performing a key function in the
assemblage of farmland as an attractive financial asset.
While asset making is largely a matter of the imaginary,
consisting of narratives, tables, and graphs, I will argue that
it cannot persist in the longer term without a base in the
material world (real scarcity of land and rising farmland
prices). As Williams (2014) and Loftus and March (2015)
contend, the materiality of the objects being financialized
Table 1 Knight Frank international farmland index
Source: Originally published in The Wealth Report produced by Knight Frank Research (Knight Frank and Citi Private Bank 2011)
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remains important. In the following sections, based on the
example of post-Soviet farmland investment, I show how
growing evidence of ‘false scarcity’ and stagnating land
prices has begun to undermine the investor imaginary
promoting farmland as an asset.
Scarcity and rising farmland values: post-Soviet
investor discourse and institutional conditions
Investor discourse
I now turn to evidence from the former Soviet region,
which—despite being a hotspot of large-scale land deals
since 2006 (Visser et al. 2012)—has received little schol-
arly attention. This section and the following ones will
draw on data from Russia (and, to some extent, Ukraine),14
whose vast stretches of fertile—including abandoned—
land seemed to hold great promise for global and domestic
land investors. The analysis is based on web-search,
interviews, farm visits, and participation in investor con-
ferences and meetings.15
Numerous factors suggest that Russia and Ukraine have,
or at least have had, a farmland rush. International and
domestic media have discussed it using titles like: ‘‘rush for
land’’, ‘‘Russian farms have become hot capitalist prop-
erty’’, ‘‘Russian farms could kill off US agriculture’’
(Visser et al. 2012). Countless web-advertisements offer
farmland. Investors’ increased interest in Russia is pri-
marily generated by very low prices and large availability
of farmland.16 This, the investor discourse goes, is not
marginal land as is often the case in, for instance, the
supposed ‘land reserves’ of African countries (Visser et al.
2012), but prime farmland, at extremely low cost (e.g. RT
2008). According to Didenko (2009), in some of the fertile
regions in Russia’s central black earth area due to the sharp
rise in demand ‘free’ land—not yet controlled by large
farms and investors- is no longer available. The director of
the Russian agroholding Razgulay, stated in 2008 (Paxton
and Budrys 2008);
By the end of 2009, all the main agricultural land in
Russia will be taken. There will still be some land in
the mountains, but there’s not much land left for
production with elevators or sugar refineries.
Furthermore, predictions of farmland price trends in Russia
were generally very positive (e.g. Indikatory rynka zemli
2008, p. 2).
The assembling of farmland as an asset: institutional
aspects
While this article has so far mostly been focused on dis-
cursive aspects of the assemblage of the post-Soviet land
rush, the longer-term institutional changes are also
important. This is particularly the case in terms of creating
liquidity, which, in turn, enables the scalability of farm-
land—as previously discussed, an important aspect
regarding the potential for profit. The introduction of the
new Russian land code in the early 2000 s allowed the free
sale of land, reinforcing the process of farmland com-
moditization that had started with the privatization of
farmland in the 1990 s following the demise of the Soviet
Union. The financialization of farmland was subsequently
enhanced by policies such as the sharp increase of state
subsidized and guaranteed cheap credit for private large-
scale investment in agriculture from the mid-2000s
onwards, the support for the development of domestic
commodity exchanges, and the promotion of loopholes in
the Russian land code regarding foreign land ownership.17
During the agrarian reforms of the 1990s, state farm
enterprises were mostly reorganized into corporations,
which separated ownership from control/management. This
was in contrast to the situation of integrated ownership-
control in family farms found in most parts of the world. In
Russia, this initially purely formal separation—when the
employers and managers became the shareholders—rapidly
shifted to a de facto separation—when outside investors,
including financial actors, began to buy up shares and
obtain corporate farms and the related landholdings in one
go (Visser et al. 2012).
14 I focus on the black earth area, where Russia’s and Ukraine’s main
agricultural regions are situated. For differences between the two
countries and their geographical differentiation in relation to farmland
investments, see Kuns et al. (2014).
15 I draw here in particular on fieldwork data concerning actors with a
transnational dimension; foreign-owned agroholdings, expat farm
managers/consultants, and real estate brokers with foreign clients.-
Web-search included English and Russian-language—general and
investor-oriented media, and company websites. Interviews were
conducted with some of the key foreign-owned farming companies,
including 4 Scandinavian-owned ones, 2 German, and 2 Dutch ones.
Interviewees were the CEOs, and additionally some farm staff and
investors. Also several interviews were conducted with Dutch expat
farm managers/consultants in foreign-owned and Russian-owned
farm companies. Where I speak of ‘interviews’ in this article without
literature references, it concerns fieldwork interviews (interviewee
identities are not disclosed). The work of Brian Kuns and Michelle
Steggerda who conducted some of the (joint) interviews, is gratefully
acknowledged. Investor meetings and conferences were attended in
Ukraine, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands.
Data collection took place during 2011–2014. For more on the
methodology see Kuns et al. (2014).
16 After the demise of the Soviet Union, an estimated 30 million
hectares of farmland fell out of production.
17 In Ukraine, repeated promises of lifting the moratorium on land
sales stimulated the land rush.
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Legitimacy: post-Soviet farmland investment
not framed as a land grab
Despite having regionally specific elements—such as a
stronger focus on the soil fertility (see below)—the
investor discourse on post-Soviet farmland shows strong
similarities with the previously described global farmland
discourse. The diverging factor is that the post-Soviet
discourse exists largely uncontested in the public sphere,
due to the absence of substantial counter-discourses. In
other words, the legitimacy of targeting farmland as a
financial investment—an important criterion for asset
making, as distinguished earlier—has been relatively ‘un-
problematic’ as compared with many other world regions.
From media research and interviews with investors, it
appears that ‘land grabbing’ is mostly seen as a non-issue.
The argument is that land grabbing does not apply to
Russia and Ukraine as there is no forced displacement of
people, villagers are longing for a continuation of large-
scale farming, and the (aging) villagers are willing to sell
or rent out their land.18 This investment discourse is not
significantly contested by societal forces, as farmer
movements or NGOs defending the land rights of rural
dwellers are weakly developed (Mamonova and Visser
2014). Soviet history has led to distrust with regard to
collective action. In Russia, the increased containment of
assertive civil movements is another cause. The uncon-
tested celebration of black earth farmland as an asset for
profitable and legitimate investment—enabled by the vir-
tual absence of counter-discourses—shows that financial
assets like ‘‘resources ‘become’ only through the triumph
of one imaginary over others’’ (Bridge 2009, p. 1221).
With the ‘triumph’ of the investment discourse over
alternatives (e.g. ‘land grab’), asset making is presented as
a depoliticized, technical process.
The erosion of farmland as an asset
Insufficient scarcity and stagnating land values
Data from news articles and investor reports from 2010
onwards, and from interviews with investors conducted in
the period 2011–2014 provide a very different picture than
the discourse discussed above, particularly in the case of
Russia. In these more recent sources—particularly the in-
depth interviews- investors painted a less rosy picture than
in the dominant public investment discourse. For instance,
an article on Russia’s fertile central black earth states:
‘‘there seems to be enough land and profits for all’’ (Kuz-
menko 2012). Moreover, the executive director of Sovecon
(a consultancy and research agency), stated: ‘‘The bad
news is that supply of land in Russia greatly exceeds
demand…’’ (ibid).
In line with this is the following statement of Mikhail
Orlov, former director of a Swedish agroholding in Russia:
‘‘Given the fact that a huge amount of land is not tilled and
is turned into woodland, it’s just not in demand’’ (ibid).
Furthermore, in a 2011 interview, a foreign farm manager
at a foreign farm company in Russia indicated:
…it’s by far not as booming as the situation you see
in other Eastern European countries, like Romania.
(…) prices of land, they might go up. Especially near
the cities (…). But if it comes to ordinary farmland,
it’s not really a topic.
In the same year, an interviewed foreign farm man-
ager/consultant for Russian agroholdings is even more
outspoken: ‘‘The rise of land prices in Russia is a myth.
There is simply too much of it’’. The Russian-American
director of the agroholding ‘Russian Farms’ even speaks of
falling land prices (RT 2008). Figures on land prices in
Russia do also indicate that, after an initial rise in the
2000s, prices have stagnated or even fallen (e.g. Economist
2012), with the exception of Russia’s prime agricultural
region, Krasnodar, which is also strategically located near
ports for export. Many agroholdings were negatively
affected when the global financial crisis hit Russia and
Ukraine in 2009 (Kuzmenko 2012), facing more difficulties
in getting low interest loans. After some improvement, the
recent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the Western
sanctions against Russia have led to economic decline in
both countries, negatively affecting agriculture (particu-
larly Ukraine).
In sum, the evidence presented above strongly suggests
that demand for agricultural land in most Russian regions is
far below the available supply. This might be an important
reason for the stagnation of farmland price increases.19
Worldwide investors are attracted to farmland largely
due to its value (hoping for land appreciation, or at least a
robust store of value) with its function as a ‘‘means of
production only as an afterthought’’ (Fairbairn 2014, p. 11).
The stagnating appreciation of farmland poses a threat to
the foundations of the farmland investment model. In the
post-Soviet area, the (initial) focus of farmland investors on
land appreciation seems to be even stronger than in other
regions—such as, for instance, South-America. A study of
the largest Scandinavian investors in Russian and Ukrai-
nian farmland shows that, until recently, they cultivated
less than 50 % of the farmland they controlled (Kuns et al.
2014). The very low prices of the fertile farmland in the
18 Visser et al. 2012 critically reviews this discourse. 19 The drop of global wheat prices since 2010 is another major factor.
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former Soviet Union are an important reason for the one-
sided focus on land values among the investors.
The inability to close the yield gap
In addition to the land values, the yields generated by post-
Soviet farmland and the profitability of the farming oper-
ations were also far below expectations. Initial yield gap
estimations by investors and investment brokers varied, but
often indicated that the productivity of Russian farmland
could increase by some 50 %, with capital gains of
50–70 % or more (Indikatory rynka zemli 2008). Some
investors even spoke about doubling or trebling produc-
tivity (Kuns et al. 2014; Lindstedt 2008, p. 181, 226).
However, in reality, none of the large foreign investors
in Russian and Ukrainian farmland—some of them 7 or
9 years in operation—have been able to close the yield gap
or come anywhere close to it. International investors were
awash with money from the stock exchange during the
period of widespread optimism about the prospects of post-
Soviet farmland (Kuns et al. 2014; Lindstedt 2008; Luyt
et al. 2013). Despite large investments in equipment and
personnel, the yields of farms operated by foreign investors
(ibid) (as well as by Russian and Ukrainian investors from
outside agriculture, see Visser et al. 2014) are not per-
forming significantly better than those of domestic (less
capitalized) farms without outside investment. Even after a
shift away from the initial strategy—predominantly
focused on rapid land acquisition with a view on appreci-
ation—to more attention for farming operations, yields and
profits from farming operations still fall short of early
expectations (Kuns et al. 2014; Luyt 2013).
Limits to standardization: soil fetishization
and asset making
Initial investor approach: celebration, separation,
and abstraction
This section deals with the question of why closing the
yield gap proved to be much more difficult than initially
expected. The investor discourse regarding Russian and
Ukrainian farmland has been characterized by a strong
focus on the enormous potential of the black earth soil,
separated from other aspects of ‘land’. Investors visiting
the black earth regions of the heartland of Russia and
Ukraine were impressed by how ‘‘amazingly deep’’ the soil
was on this ‘‘phenomenally productively land’’ (Rachke-
vych 2012) holding ‘‘incredible potential’’ (Pratt 2013).
When an agronomist of the Black Earth Farming company
showed delegates at a farm forum pictures of the rich black
soil, the forum’s audience ‘‘groaned with envy’’ (ibid). The
foreign companies operating farms in Russia often have
pictures of the black earth soil on their websites. ‘Black
Earth Farming’ even features the fertile soil in its name.
The strong focus on the fertility of the soil gives the
impression that investors cannot go wrong by investing in
the land.
This focus on the soil, in isolation from other features of
land and its wider context, is illustrated by Black Earth
Farming’s director-founder, Mikhael Orlov. On his ‘road-
show’ along the financial centers of Europe to attract
investors for his company, he took some of the black earth
soil with him. During meetings with potential investors, he
showed them the soil, so they could see and feel its prime
quality. This aptly illustrates the process of separating one
aspect of a natural resource in the process of abstraction
that is central to asset making.
One could speak of the black earth soil’s ‘fetishization’,
both in the common meaning of the word—‘‘an excessive
and irrational commitment to (something)’’20—as well as,
to some extent, in the meaning of commodity fetishization
in Marxism—the tendency to objectify value created
through social relations, as if it were residing in the pro-
duced objects themselves.
While the investor discourse is constructed, it clearly did
have some foundation in the material reality, if a rather
one-sided and weak one. Although black earth soils can
also be found in some other parts of the world the cases of
Russia and Ukraine are rather unique in that the black earth
soils are very deep (and subsequently more fertile), with
vast areas of low-priced—and sometimes abandoned—
farmland.
Furthermore, the asset making that built on the investor
discourse celebrating the black earth soil, was also facili-
tated by and built on long-standing global discourses on the
scarcity of farmland. More specific historical discourses
fetishizing the black earth soil date from Tsarist (Moon
2013) and Soviet eras, which resulted in the ignorance of
other agro-climatic factors, such as heat and insufficient
rainfall, which can reduce agricultural yields (Moon 2013).
‘Back to reality’: the biophysical limits of asset
making
In recent interviews, various investors in post-Soviet
farmland indicated that the importance of soil fertility for
agricultural productivity and profits has generally been
overstated (cf. Kuns et al. 2014). Referring to the
2006–2007 land rush period, one investor said that his
company and other Western investors ‘‘were driven by a
simplistic view’’ (cf. Luyt et al. 2013). The prevailing idea,
20 Definition from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/eng
lish/fetish.
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as emerged from interviews, was ‘‘land is cheap, let’s go
and buy it’’ and ‘‘as much as you can’’. ‘‘At that time it
sounded logical’’.
This overly-optimistic view was not corrected by more
careful, evidence-based assessments, as farm managers and
agronomists had no voice in the boardrooms where the
major decisions were made. The top levels of the agro-
holdings often consist of persons with a background in
finance and other ‘real sectors’, instead of agriculture or
agribusiness. Among the three Nordic farm companies
listed on the stock exchange that operate in the post-Soviet
region, none featured members with agricultural experi-
ence on their boards during the first years of operation
(Kuns et al. 2014).21 The executive director of one com-
plained that his advice against the purchase of a large
farm—due to its poor agro-climatic features—was ignored
by the board, where the view of buying as much land as
possible prevailed (Lindstedt 2008). The investor-led farm
companies in Russia and Ukraine control huge holdings
with up to several hundreds of thousands of hectares and
some two thousand employees, which are run in a hierar-
chical fashion (Nikulin 2005). In such an organizational
environment, aberrant views from the farm level could not
easily make it to the top.
Over time, investors found out—through a costly
learning process—that the general weather conditions and
microclimate, and in particular the availability of water, are
much more critical for productivity than expected. As an
investor stated:
We thought that the black soil is the best thing, (…)
that you should go for the black soil regions and this
was the big, you know, focus for us when we started.
(…) You can have the best soil in the world, but if the
temperature goes up over 35 degrees, and soil tem-
perature goes to 60 degrees, then you have no rain for
4–5 weeks in a row, it will kill your crop.
In sum, the initial focus on soil fertility—a clear example
of the separation, abstraction, and standardization that are
part of resource and asset making in farmland—appears to
have been too narrow. In the rare cases where farmland
investors took into account precipitation, they used stan-
dardized indicators such as average annual rainfall by
province, which did not capture the drastic interregional
and seasonal variability. This resulted in a shaky founda-
tion for asset making, with a subsequently sharp erosion of
farmland as a financial asset once investors, faced with
recurrent droughts, recognized that soil fertility was a weak
predictor of yields and profits.22
Conclusions
This article set out to investigate one of the little examined,
basic premises of the global ‘land rush’—the idea that
farmland is running out, land values are rising globally, and
farmland is bound to be a profitable business. Mostly, this
process of commoditization and resource making is pre-
sented as a far-reaching, speedy process, a juggernaut
which will continue its course relentlessly unless forcefully
resisted.
I first showed that global, macro trends that supposedly
lead to land shortages (such as growing population or
changing diets) do not automatically translate into rapid
commoditization and asset making around the globe. The
expectation of a solid, ongoing farmland boom in Russia
and Ukraine was based on superficial comparisons and the
translation of global trends directly to a particular region.
Such yield gap suggesting comparisons were based on
highly standardized and very selective assessments of the
profitability of farmland investment, in turn largely based
on one indicator (soil fertility), which was separated from
other aspects of farmland and the wider rural context. The
notion of the global land rush following the 2007–2008
food crisis has become so dominant that the different tra-
jectories of farmland investment in various localities tend
to be overlooked (cf. Hall 2013).
Second, I showed that commoditization and asset mak-
ing are not one-way processes, and that land that promises
to become a profitable asset may become less valuable and
less asset-like overtime. In Russia, the early boom in
farmland commoditization and land prices stagnated, or
even reversed, almost as quickly as it started. However,
while there can be stagnation or a reverse movement, it
does not necessarily mean that farmland will fully return to
its previous state. Once having been implicated in the
process of asset making, it seems likely that some of the
transformations/alternations in the function(s) and percep-
tions of farmland, will linger. To what extent, and in what
ways, financialization still looms in the background after a
stagnation in asset making is an important question for
further research.
I also suggest that it is important to differentiate
between commoditization and resource making on the one
hand, and asset making on the other. While a financial asset
can be seen as an ‘advanced’ stage of commoditization, it
is clearly distinct from a ‘simple’ (‘non-assetized’) com-
modity or natural resource, due its higher degree of stan-
dardization and liquidity. Thus, we should indeed be
careful when substituting the ‘commodification of every-
thing’ with the ‘financialization of everything’ (Loftus and
March 2015, p. 174).23 ‘‘Rather than being dazzled by’’ the21 Even the executive director, often did not have an agricultural
background.
22 Economic slow-down caused further ‘de-assitisation’. 23 Also the former should be critically assessed.
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apparent speed and scale of finance (Pike and Pollard 2010,
p. 34, cited in Williams 2014, p. 423), we should carefully
study it, not confusing, for instance, the speed or magnitude
of farmland commoditization with those of financializa-
tion.24 Thus, while large stretches of African land are
enclosed (commoditized) through large-scale farmland
deals (White et al. 2012), the amount of farmland turned
into a financial asset seems to be much lower, due to low
profitability and liquidity (Visser 2015). In the post-Soviet
region I studied, as well as in much of the global North,25
the current finance-driven land rush is primarily a process
of asset making, and to a lesser extent of enclosure, as
much of the land was already privately held, and quite
strongly commoditized as it could already be bought and
sold.26 That being said, I do not want to understate the
impacts of large-scale farmland investment and financial-
ization. Also, stagnation in the process of asset making
does not necessarily mean a lower local rural impact than
in cases where farmland is fully transformed into a finan-
cial asset. Financial investors that exit hastily when their
farmland investment appears less of an attractive asset than
initially expected can leave local people worse off than if
they had not entered or, instead, had undergone their full-
scale, ongoing investment.
The typology of asset making—and its application to
global representations of scarcity and land values in gen-
eral and the post-Soviet region in particular—shows
empirically that asset making is very much a process of
assemblage, as some recently anticipated/suggested, and
that a range of criteria have to be met before farmland is
transformed into a financial asset. It is fruitful to recognize
the fact that the financialization of farmland—like finan-
cialization in general—is an ‘‘unfinished business’’ (Ertu¨rk
et al. 2008), ‘‘marked by tensions between its rhetoric and
its reality’’ (Williams 2014, p. 410). Uncritical recycling of
popular farmland rush idiom and notions of ‘the world
running out of farmland’ blinds us to the multifaceted,
variegated, and highly influential processes of farmland
investment and financialization as they unfold in reality.
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